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Abstract 
 
 
What account can we give of the nature of the individuality of concrete particulars that allows many 
properties to inhere in them? Campbell argues that concrete particulars are bundles of tropes, or of 
instances of qualities. It is argued that we should individuate tropes spatiotemporally, as Schaffer 
suggests we should, and that such a spatiotemporal individuation principle makes Campbell’s model 
require that the Identity of Indiscernibles be a necessary truth, which he rejects. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
The problem of concrete individuals is the problem of how many distinct properties 
inhere in one, single individual. What account can we give of the nature of the 
individuality of concrete particulars that allows many properties to inhere in them? 
 
Before putting forward his own solution to this problem, Campbell speaks of a 
proposed solution, the universal bundle theory. This solution states that for some 
concrete particular, a, if we list all the universals which a instantiates—say F, G, and 
H—then the bundle of F, G, and H will be a itself. However, says Campbell, there 
could be some concrete particular, b, which also instantiates all and only F, G, and H. 
Thus, on this view, b would be identical by definition with the very same bundle with 
which a is identical, merely on the basis that a and b instantiate the very same 
universals—in other words, on the basis of the indiscernibility of a and b.  But, as 
Campbell points out, this solution makes the Identity of Indiscernibles a necessary 
truth, while in reality it is no such thing. 
 
Campbell’s own solution is that concrete individuals are bundles, not of universals, but 
of tropes—more specifically, bundles of all and only compresent tropes. While the 
Res Cogitans (2015) 6                                                                                                         Fishman | 80 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
green universal of my backpack is identical with, and thus indiscernible from, the green 
universal of my spinach, the green trope of my backpack is neither identical with nor 
indiscernible from the green trope of my spinach. Thus, Campbell claims, no two 
distinct bundles of tropes will be indiscernible, so the problem of the necessity of the 
Identity of Indiscernibles does not arise.1 Campbell’s solution appears compelling, but 
on closer examination it will become apparent that the trope bundle solution succumbs 
to the same problems as does the universal bundle solution. To see why this is so, we 
must more closely examine the structure of the trope. 
 
A trope, as Campbell describes it, is an instance of a quality. But importantly, tropes are 
also regional, and as such they have shapes and sizes, or are at least shaped and sized. 
Campbell says, “Real tropes are qualities-of-a-formed-volume.”2 I take him here not to 
be saying that tropes are qualities which have, perhaps necessarily, but not essentially, 
regions of a certain shape and size, but rather to be saying that a trope’s region, its 
shape, and its size are in fact essential to it. 
 
A trope, then, is not so simply structured as ‘instance of a quality’ makes it sound. 
Tropes are of at least three aspects—quality, shape, size. We must add yet a fourth 
aspect, one which will differentiate non-identical tropes of the same quality, shape, and 
size. Surely a one-acre-grassy-square trope in China is not identical to a one-acre-
grassy-square trope in England. But what is the basis on which they are distinct? What 
is the fourth aspect of the trope? 
 
As Schaffer points out, they cannot be distinct merely on the basis that the one-acre-
grassy-square trope in China is the one-acre-grassy-square trope of field C, say, while 
the one in England is the trope of field E, as tropes, at least on Campbell’s view, are 
taken to be fundamental, with concrete particulars dependent upon them for reality.3,4 If 
the particularity of the field is dependent upon the particularity of the trope, the 
particularity of the trope cannot be dependent upon the particularity of the field. 
 
Schaffer then claims that we are left with two possible principles for the individuation 
of tropes: Quantitative Individuation, and Spatiotemporal Individuation. I confess that I 
cannot imagine any other possible contenders. On the former view, tropes are 
individuated on the basis of their being quantitatively distinct; this view would have to 
take it as primitive that the trope in China and the trope in England are non-identical. 
                                                          
1 Keith Campbell, “The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars,” in Properties, eds. D.H. Mellor and 
Alex Oliver (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997): 131-132. 
2 Campbell, “Abstract Particulars,” 137. 
3 Jonathan Schaffer, “The Individuation of Tropes,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79, no. 2 
(2001): 249. 
4 Campbell, “Abstract Particulars,” 128. 
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On the latter view, “x and y are distinct tropes iff they are either not exactly resembling, 
or at distant locations (Distance(x,y)>0).”5 
 
Schaffer provides many good reasons for why we should accept the principle of 
Spatiotemporal, rather than Quantitative, Individuation. For one thing, one of 
Campbell’s arguments against the substratum solution to the problem of concrete 
individuals—that is, the view that a concrete individual is a bare particular or unit of 
Prime Matter which qualities inform—is that the bare particular or Prime Matter or 
substratum will be imperceptible; all we can perceive are the qualities informing it. 
Likewise, quantitative identities are imperceptible, and so will create epistemic barriers 
for our individuation of tropes, which are supposed to be “the immediate objects of 
perception.”6 These barriers do not exist if we choose Spatiotemporal Individuation, 
because we “can see whether [a trope] is here or there, but not whether it is this or 
that.”7 
 
It should now be clear that if the individuating aspect of the trope is quantitative 
identity—that is, this red trope’s being this redness—then the trope bundle solution will 
not succumb to the difficulties faced by the universal bundle solution; since quantitative 
identity is not perceptible, we cannot use it as a basis to discern between tropes. Thus it 
will be possible for indiscernible tropes to be non-identical. That this difficulty is still 
faced once we determine that tropes are not individuated on the basis of quantitative 
identity will be argued below. 
 
Another strength of the principle of Spatiotemporal Individuation is that it allows the 
trope theorist to avoid two powerful objections levelled against her. These are 
Armstrong’s swapping and piling objections. Let us call the one-acre-grassy-square 
trope in field C ‘Bill’, and the one in E ‘Bob’. The swapping objection points out that 
between our world and a world exactly like ours except that Bill and Bob are 
swapped—that is, if Bill were to become a trope of field E and Bob a trope of field C—
the trope theorist with the principle of Quantitative Individuation will claim that there is 
a real difference, that the two worlds are distinct, even though there is in principle 
absolutely no empirical or causal difference between the two. As Schaffer says, the 
“difference seems purely verbal.”8 On the other hand, if the trope theorist embraces the 
principle of Spatiotemporal Individuation, she will not have to claim that any real 
difference between the worlds; on her view, the one-acre-grassy-square trope at the 
location of E in the other world is the closest counterpart to the Bob in our world, and 
the one in the location of C in that world is the closest counterpart to the Bill in our 
                                                          
5 Schaffer, “Individuation,” 249. 
6 Campbell, “Abstract Particulars,” 130. 
7 Schaffer, “Individuation,” 249. 
8 Schaffer, “Individuation,” 250. 
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world. Thus with Spatiotemporal Individuation, Bob is the trope of E in the location of 
E and Bill is the trope of C in the location of C in both worlds.9 
 
The piling objection takes any field which is one acre and square, and asks whether it 
can have two grassy tropes.  For instance, can field C have as tropes both Bill and Ben, 
another one-acre-grassy-square trop quantitatively distinct from Bill? Again, there will 
be no empirical or causal difference between a world in which both Bill and Ben are 
tropes of C and an otherwise alike world in which just Bill is a trope of C. Yet the trope 
theorist holding principle of Quantitative Individuation must claim that there is a real 
difference between the two worlds. Once again, the trope theorist with the principle of 
Spatiotemporal Individuation can deny any difference between the worlds. “A ‘pile’ of 
[grassinesses] is just a grassiness here and a grassiness also-here, which are now seen to 
be identified. [Spatiotemporal Individuation] flattens the pile.”10 
 
These seem to me the most powerful of Schaffer’s many objections to the principle of 
Quantitative Individuation, and I take them to be successful in demonstrating the 
obligation on the trope theorist to accept the principle of Spatiotemporal Individuation. 
Once the theorist has done this, we can add spatiotemporal location, as the 
differentiator, to the list of aspects of a trope. We now have as the aspects of a trope 
<quality, shape, size, location>. 
 
Another way of saying that location is one aspect of a trope is to say that tropes are 
essentially located. As located, tropes can have spatiotemporal relations just like any 
other located object. It can be said, for example, that there is some trope, j, is ten miles 
from some other trope, k. 
 
Imagine a trope, T1, and another trope, T2, non-identical to T1. T2 either will or will 
not be compresent with T1. First suppose that it is. Recall that the principle of 
Spatiotemporal Individuation implies that if two tropes are distinct, like T1 and T2 are 
by hypothesis, then either they are not exactly resembling or are not at zero distance. 
But since we have supposed that they are compresent, they are at zero distance; so we 
must conclude that T1 and T2 are not exactly resembling. T1 and T2 must differ either 
in quality, in shape, or in size. As these aspects are all perceivable, it would be possible 
to discern between T1 and T2 on the basis of any of them. Thus if they are compresent, 
T1 and T2 cannot be indiscernible if they are not identical. 
 
Now suppose that the two tropes are not compresent, and so that they are not at zero 
distance from each other. We can pick an arbitrary point, P, in space time such that 
Distance(T1,P) ≠ Distance(T2,P), as we can for any two located objects. On the basis of 
their differing distances from P, we can now discern T1 and T2, so once again, they are 
                                                          
9 Schaffer, “Individuation,” 253. 
10 Schaffer, “Individuation,” 251. 
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not indiscernible. Thus, whether they are compresent or not, if T1 and T2 are not 
identical, then they are not indiscernible. By contraposition, then, if two tropes are 
indiscernible, then they are identical. 
 
Let us now consider, not tropes, but bundles of tropes. Suppose bundle U contains some 
green trope and some grassy trope, and that bundle V likewise contains some green 
trope and some grassy trope. Further, supposed bundle W contains the green universal 
and the grassy universal, and that bundle Z likewise contains the green universal and 
the grassy universal. We all recognize, following Campbell, that U and V are not 
necessarily identical, while W and Z are. But we must also recognize that, while W and 
Z are necessarily indiscernible, U and V are not. 
 
Now suppose that bundle U and V are, as a matter of fact, indiscernible. This will 
require, of course that the green tropes in X and Y be indiscernible, and that the grassy 
tropes in X and Y be indiscernible. However, as we have seen above, if tropes are 
indiscernible, then they are identical. If the two tropes in X are identical to the two 
tropes in Y, then X and Y are themselves identical; they are bundles of the very same 
entities, and so, are the very same bundle. Campbell’s trope bundle solution to the 
problem of concrete individuals thus requires the necessity of the Identity of 
Indiscernibles just as much as the universal bundle solution does. The substantive 
criticism Campbell makes of the universal bundle solution—that it makes the Identity 
of Indiscernibles a necessary truth—thus applies equally to Campbell’s own trope 
bundle solution. 
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